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Abstract: The arrangement of self-governance institutions is the main obstacle to achieving sustainability for 
ecosystems and local livelihoods. The aim of this study was to describe the institutional sustainability of 
Community Conservation Agreement (CCA) in Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), located in Central Sulawesi 
Province, Indonesia. This study applied a descriptive method by identifying and analyzing the relationship 
between characteristics of the community and nearby resources, as well as the regulations and rules (formal 
and local rules arranged in CCA), behavior and performance of institutional CCA, and the interests and power 
of stakeholders. The research demonstrates that high institutional sustainability of CCA is not only 
determined by the relations among the community, but that it is also motivated by the common interests to 
preserve water in the LLNP area as a means for avoiding disaster. However, principles of collective-choice 
arrangements, minimal recognition of rights to organize, and nested enterprises in CCA were not running 
well. Strategies to improve the institutional sustainability of CCA include unifying landscape zones that 
describe property rights of local communities within a conservation area that is recognized by all 
stakeholders and should be supported by formal legal rules. 
Keywords: Conservation; sustainability, local community; Lore Lindu; National Park; collaborative 
management 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Command and control policies for national park management in Indonesia have many obstacles 
as they often dismiss local resources and the capacity of local institutions. Resource characteristics 
include features that are important when developing resource management (Cox et al., 2010). 
Resource characteristics define the interdependent relationships between individuals and groups. 
These characteristics include incompatibility in use and high exclusion costs (Schmidt, 2004). 
High exclusion cost is characteristic of resources system of common pool resources (CPRs) while 
incompatibility in use is characteristic of resources unit of CPRs (Schmidt, 2004). National park 
generates goods and services such as biodiversity, landscape beauty and various ecological 
functions needed by wide people. In addition, it produces timber and non-timber forest products 
needed by local communities. This characteristic of resources is high exclusion cost.  The use of 
resources for certain purposes creates a situation of incompatibility in use. 
High exclusion costs for a local community and incompatibility with resource use are problems 
common to many national parks in Indonesia. Local communities who lived around national parks 
have been excluded from utilization of forest resources in national parks. Forests, seen from the 
local community perspective, is the result of social construction between communities surrounding 
an ecosystem (Safitri, 2013). However, the local community activities in withdrawing and managing 
of forest resources are sometimes not in accordance with formal rules of the management of 
national parks. Livelihood interests and conservation interests can come into conflict within National 
Park (Yusran et al., 2017). National park designation prohibits certain community activities. Use 
incompatibility often indicates approximately two or three activities that cannot be implemented 
concurrently because of specific requirements (Kartodihardjo, 2006). This requires appropriate 
institutional arrangements to achieve the goal of conservation and ensure community needs are 
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met (Acheson, 2006). 
The approach that has been applied to overcome high exclusion costs and use incompatibility 
in LLNP is the Community Conservation Agreement (CCA). This program was initiated by Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs) in the early 2000s (Birner and Mappatoba, 2009). However, 
implementation of CCA has faced obstacles in terms of its structure and capacity (Massiri, 2015). 
This requires a new strategy if CCA is to achieve institutional sustainability as a self-governing 
institution. Self-governing institutions demand autonomy for the proprietors in arranging 
operational rules (Ostrom 1990).   
 One critical problem for institutional design is the issue of sustainability (Adiwibowo et al., 
2012) and effectiveness to overcome the open access problem.  One component of sustainability is 
sustainable benefit. The success of co-management institutions is determined by the benefits 
received by local communities (Ray and Bhattacharya, 2011). Communities will be responsible for 
natural resources when perceived benefits are fast, local, and decent (Uphoff, 1992). Ostrom (1990) 
defines design principles that lead to long-term management of certain natural resources. These 
principles include: a clearly defined boundary, congruence, collective-choice arrangements, 
monitoring, conflict-resolution mechanisms, graduated sanctions, minimal recognition of rights to 
organize, and nested enterprises that are part of a larger systems.  
Institutional performance in the management of natural resources is varied (Ostrom, 1994; 
Baggio et al. 2016). Some groups design institutions to overcome the open access problem, while 
others do not (Gautam and Shivakoti, 2005; Quinn et al., 2007; Gavrilets, 2015). Institutional 
behavior and performance are determined by situation and structure. Situation is characteristic of 
resources, while structure is the policy or rules that regulated the resource (Schmid 2004). The 
characteristic of resource systems of LLNP is high exclusion cost for the local community, while the 
characteristic of unit resources of LLNP is incompatibility in use of resources. Research on 
institutional sustainability is essential to determine effective institutional arrangements for national 
park management. The research question of this article is whether the institutional arrangements 
of CCA is sustained, and whether it becomes a solution to the problem situation of high exclusion 
costs and incompatibility in use. This research describes: 1) The institutional sustainability of CCA 
and its effectiveness in sustainably maintaining the LLNP ecosystem; and 2) The strategy for 
institutional sustainability in achieving a self-governed CCA. 
2. Materials and Methods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 1. Study area 
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2.1 Study Area 
This research was conducted in Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), Central Sulawesi Province, 
Indonesia (Figure 1). There were four locations of CCA evaluation: Bobo, Wuasa, Betue and Lempe 
villages. These locations were selected based on their community heterogeneity and distance from 
Palu, the district capital of Central Sulawesi. 
3.1 Data Collection 
Data for this study was collected in 2015 through 1) Focused Group Discussion (FGD) for staff 
of village conservation council (Lembaga Konservasi Desa/LKD), and communities taking part as a 
member of the CCA in four villages around the LLNP area in order to obtain data on behavior and 
performance of the CCA, 2) In-depth interviews for key informants includes village chiefs, leaders of 
customary institutions, four people from the Buffer Zone Forum (Forum Wilayah Penyangga/FWP), 
two Local Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) facilitating the arrangement of CCA, and LLNP 
Officers; 3) documentation that detail the rules in the CCA documents and the rules regulating 
national park management; and 4) making observation plots in the form of two transects of 200 meters 
in CCA areas. 
3.2 Data Analysis 
This study applied a descriptive method (Irawan, 2006; Neville, 2007), i.e. identifying and 
classifying the characteristics of study subjects. This study identified and analyzed the relationship 
between the situation, structure, behavior, performance, interest and power of stakeholders in 
implementing CCA. Behavior and performance are determined by situation, structure and the roles 
of stakeholders. Variables of the situation include characteristic of the community and physical 
characteristics of the forest, while variables of structures include government policy or rules 
regulated in the protected area, and rules regulated in CCA. Behavior of CCA Institutions was 
examined with applied design principles from long enduring institutions (Ostrom 1990); while 
Performance, as outcomes from the institutions, was examined through analysis of forest conditions 
in the CCA area. Principle and indicators for evaluation of institutional sustainability of CCA are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Principle and indicator for evaluation of institutional sustainability of CCA 
Principles Indicators 
Clearly defined boundary clarity of physical boundary of CCA area in LLNP 
clarity of property rights and rules of CCA that could be explained by the 
community members of CCA 
Congruence congruence between benefit and cost 
congruence between rules and economic conditions of the local community 
congruence between rules of CCA and local communities needs 
Collective-choice arrangement the intensity of meetings in the past five years 
the number of people attending the meetings 
Monitoring monitoring process is actively conducted by the local institution 
Graduated sanctions customary sanctions could be enforced for the violator 
Conflict resolution mechanism existing institutions and procedures for resolving conflicts that are ongoing 
Minimal recognition of rights to 
organize 
LLNP officers recognize the rights of local communities to arrange the internal 
use of resources in the CCA area 
Nested enterprises The linkages of rules at an operational, collective choice, and constitutional level  
3. Results and Discussion  
3.1 Overview of Institutional Sustainability of CCA 
This research examines design principles to assess the institutional sustainability of CCA in LLNP. 
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3.1.1. Clearly defined boundaries 
The clarity of a physical boundary, as well as the clarity of property rights owned by individuals 
comprise a clearly defined boundary (Quinn et al., 2007). This research used two indicators to 
describe this principle, namely the clarity of physical boundaries of the CCA area in LLNP, and the 
clarity of property rights and rules of the CCA that community members were able to explain. This 
research found that the physical boundaries of the CCA area in LLNP were clearly defined by the 
communities in Betue village, while the communities in Bobo, Wuasa, and Lempe village could not 
be defined within the physical boundaries of the CCA area in LLNP.   
Communities in Betue and Lempe village understood the arrangement of property rights and 
rules within the CCA, while in Bobo and Wuasa village many local people did not understand the 
property rights and rules outlined in the agreement. The size and heterogeneity of the communities 
within the villages are likely to affect the level of trust and ultimately affect collective action, though 
their relationship to collective action is typically nonlinear (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). Bobo and 
Wuasa villages were heterogeneous and included many migrants, while the characteristic of 
communities in Betue and Lempe village were homogenous with few migrants. The number of 
villagers in Bobo and Wuasa is, respectively, 1.082 and 3.029, with a total corresponding population 
density of 47 people/km2 and 24 people/km2, respectively. 
3.1.2. Congruence 
The principle of congruence is key to arranging CPR institutions. An absence of congruence in 
local-level management indicates that a community is unable to adapt to changes (Quinn et al. 
2007). This research used three indicators of congruence: congruence between benefit and cost, 
between rules arranged in CCA and the economic condition of the local community, and between 
rules arranged in CCA and local community needs. 
Congruence between benefit and cost is an essential factor in forest management (Agrawal and 
Yadama 1997). Stakeholder at the local level, including members of LKD, FWP, Village Chief, and 
customary institution who have the responsibility to control and maintain the rules arranged in the 
CCA, did not receive appropriate revenue according to their level of effort. Although they did not 
receive income, some local stakeholders revealed that they received benefits from implementing 
the CCA rules, such as regulating the availability of water from the forest and in implementing 
programs for landslide prevention. Maintaining sources of water and avoiding natural disaster 
caused by forest damage is the motivation of some local institutions for implementing the CCA. 
Implementation of the CCA less directly supported the economic improvement of local 
communities. However, the rules of CCA supported local community needs, particularly needs 
related to water and landslide prevention. The CCA areas in Bobo and Betue villages are located in 
a wilderness zone of LLNP; in Lempe village, the CCA area are located in a utilization zone; and in 
Wuasa village, the CCA area is located in a rehabilitation zone and utilization zone of the LLNP. In 
the rehabilitation zone, the local communities have a high motivation to cultivate crops. However, 
formal legal rules of national park management prohibit cultivation in the rehabilitation zone. Based 
on the formal legal rules of national park management, the designation of the rehabilitation zone is 
for restoring damaged ecosystems to become close to the original ecosystem conditions. 
3.1.3. Collective-Choice Arrangement 
The third design principle described by Ostrom is the collective-choice arrangement. One of the 
failures in managing CPRs is that appropriators who depend on the resource are not allowed to 
participate in modifying the operational rules (Ostrom and Cox 2010). Indicators of collective-choice 
arrangements in this research include the number of meetings and the number of people attending 
the meetings. When the local stakeholders were supported by international NGO funding, the 
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number of meetings was relatively large. However, the meetings were only attended by the local 
elite. After funding ceased, meetings were rarely conducted. Stakeholders in Wuasa village have not 
conducted a meeting to discuss the CCA for five years. 
Ting et al. (2012), highlights the principle of collective choice arrangement in community based- 
co-management of Baishuijiang National Natural Reserve, China, which was not running well 
because the implementation of community-based collaborative management was still dependent 
on collaborative projects funded by an international NGO. The same case is true of the village 
conservation agreement in Kerinci Seblat National Park, Indonesia, in which only 43% of 
implementation of the conservation agreement was sustained for five years as part of the Integrated 
development program (Wood et al., 2014). This situation also seems to be reflected in the case with 
LLNP, in which the performance of some local institutions implementing the CCA has decreased after 
the project ends. After project ended, the intensity of the meetings and the number of people 
attending the meetings were rarely conducted.  
3.1.4. Principle of Monitoring 
Performance is not only determined by collective choice rules, but also how those rules are 
overseen and enforced (Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006). Institutions can be long enduring if it 
integrates low cost monitoring approaches (Ostrom, 1990; Andersson et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
Ostrom (1990) also shows that few resource systems are sustained without conducting active 
monitoring processes. Regular monitoring demonstrates the ability to improve forest conditions 
(Gibson et al., 2005; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006; Pandey, 2010). 
Monitoring in accordance with the CCA was conducted by LKD and LLNP Officers, as well as 
forest rangers, every six months. These monitoring activities continue through efforts of the LKD 
and LLNP Officers in Bobo, Betue and Lempe villages, but the LKD in Wuasa Village is no longer 
monitoring the CCA area. The Chief of LKD in Wuasa indicated that LLNP officers were not 
responding to the LKD, even though LKD members sought to monitor the forest within LLNP. The 
LKDs in Bobo, Betue and Lempe villages are motivated to monitor forest resources by the need of 
water from the forest in LLNP, and to avoid natural disasters caused by forest damage. 
3.1.5. Graduated Sanctions 
Imposing sanctions aim to prevent participants from violating the rules (Ostrom and Cox, 2010,  
Nugroho, 2013). Graduated sanctions must ensure that the cost is greater than the benefit received 
from breaking the rules (Ostrom 2009). 
In the rules of CCA, communities who violate operational rules are subject to customary 
sanction, determined by customary institutions, community leaders, LLNP officers, and witnessed 
by the local community. Besides monetary fines, social sanctions carry a social cost because it is 
witnessed by many people. Customary institutions in Betue and Lempe village still apply the sessions 
to impose sanctions for violators of operational rules. Customary sanctions imposed on violating 
parties are called giwu. Customary hearings for violators are carried out openly and witnessed by 
community members. In Bobo Village, LKD handed over the violator to an authority without 
conducting a customary trial. In Wuasa, customary sanctions were not enforced, and the violator 
did not receive sanction. Communities in Bobo and Wuasa village are heterogeneous, with many 
migrants. Customary sanction therefore, is more difficult to impose due the likelihood that people 
will adhere to such decisions. Moreover, the land in the rehabilitation zone in Wuasa village was  
privately owned by local communities. 
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3.1.6. Principle of conflict-resolution mechanisms 
This principle emphasizes the importance of the low cost for conflict resolution in managing 
the resource system (Ostrom, 1990). In this case, the resolution for resource conflicts is arranged by 
the local institution according to CCA rules.  FWP is an institution that has a responsibility to facilitate 
conflict resolution related with resources in LLNP and local village use. FWP is the representation of 
each LKD that is in one sub-district. The establishment of the FWP was facilitated by NGOs through 
the project entitled Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development Conservation Program 
(CSIADCP). This research finds that the capacity of FWP was low after the CSIADCP project ended. 
However, conflict resolution for the utilization of forest resources in CCA areas in homogenous 
villages, particularly in Betue and Lempe village, was mediated by customary institutions. Customary 
rules in homogenous villages are still maintained by the local community, while in heterogeneous 
villages involve many migrants, and customary rules were no longer obeyed. 
3.1.7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
Property rights and rules arranged by the CCA at the operational level facilitated by NGOs are 
not implemented and enforced by local institutions because LLNP officers did not recognize 
management rights of the local community to manage the internal use of forest resources in the 
CCA areas. LLNP officers deny the right of local communities to manage resources within LLNP 
because some CCA rules are not in line with formal legal rules of LLNP management. According to 
the LLNP Officer, CCA rules should be reviewed and should refer to formal legal rules at a 
constitutional level. 
In recent years, the government issued a regulation to support community conservation 
partnership in the protected area, including rules concerning procedures for partnership in the 
management of the protected area (P85/Menhut-II/2014), as well as technical instructions for 
conservation partnerships in protected areas (P6/KSDAE/Set/Kum.1/6/2018), which could facilitate 
better coordination between CCA and LLNP management. 
3.1.8. Recognition of rights to organize 
This research examined the linkages of rules at operational, collective and constitutional levels. 
It finds that some operational rules and collective choice rules of CCA were not supported by 
constitutional rules. The rules at the constitutional level are those that determine the form of 
governance (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). The governance system of national parks in Indonesia is 
top-down, governed by the state, and values the uses of resources to emphasize environmental 
protection. Local CCA decisions cannot be implemented if their decisions were not in line with 
formal legal rules at the constitutional level. The operational rules of CCA, which are not in line with 
formal legal rules, are the rules allowing the local community to cultivate crops in the rehabilitation 
zone and allowing local communities to harvest timber for local needs. However, the designation of 
utilization zones, based on legal formal rules, is intended to create natural ecotourism and 
recreation, environmental services, education, research that support development of utilization, 
cultivation activities, and designation of the rehabilitation zone that intends to support restoration 
of damaged ecosystems to become more, or close to the natural ecosystem conditions.  
Development of rules on one level, without supporting rules on other levels, would create an 
unstable system that is unlikely to endure (Ostrom, 1990). 
The high institutional sustainability of CCA was located in Betue and Lempe village, while 
institutional sustainability of CCA in in Bobo and Wuasa village was moderate to low. In 
heterogeneous villages (Bobo and Wuasa village), the customary sanctions could not be enforced, 
and the customary rules regulating the uses of forest resources were no longer understood by local 
communities. Contrary to homogenous villages with few migrants, customary rules were 
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understood by local people, customary sanctions could be enforced, and forest monitoring was still 
running. However, principles that were functioning poorly in the CCA include collective choice, 
minimal recognition of the right to organize, and nested enterprises. This indicates that CCA 
institutions in homogenous villages have not been recognized by the LLNP officers as a part of LLNP 
management. Condition of Institutional sustainability of CCA is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Condition of institutional sustainability of CCA  
Prinsip Indikator Institution of 
CCA 
Value Verifier 
Clearly defined 
boundary 
clarity of physical boundary of 
CCA area in LLNP 
Betue 5 clear 
Bobo, Wuasa, 
Lempe 
3 less clear 
clarity of property rights and 
rules of CCA that could be 
explained by the community 
members of CCA 
Betue, Lempe 5 clear 
Bobo, Wuasa 3 less clear  
Congruence congruence between benefit and 
cost 
Bobo, Wuasa, 
Betue, Lempe 
3 less congruence 
congruence between rules and 
economic condition of the local 
community 
Bobo, Wuasa, 
Betue, Lempe 
3 less support for the improvement of 
the local community economies 
congruence between rules CCA 
and the local communities needs 
Bobo, Betue, 
Lempe 
5 congruence 
Wuasa 3 less congruence  
Collective-
choice 
arrangement 
the intensity of meeting in the 
past five years 
Bobo, Betue, 
Lempe 
3 seldom  
Wuasa 1 never  
the number of people attending 
the meetings 
Betue, Lempe 3 not many local communities 
participating 
Bobo, Wuasa 1 most local communities did not 
participate 
Monitoring monitoring processes are actively 
conducted by the local institution 
Bobo, Betue, 
Lempe 
5 active 
Wuasa 1 did not active 
Graduated 
sanctions 
customary sanction could be 
enforced for the violator 
Betue, Lempe 5 could be enforced 
Bobo 3 could not be enforced, but local 
institution handed over the violator 
to the appropriate authority 
Wuasa 1 could not be enforced, the violator 
did not impose the sanction 
Conflict 
resolution 
mechanism 
existing institutions and 
procedures for resolving conflicts 
that are still running 
Betue, Lempe 5 there were active institutions and 
procedures for resolving conflicts 
Bobo, Wuasa 3 there were institutions and 
procedures for resolving conflict, but 
it was no longer operational 
Minimal 
recognition of 
rights to 
organize 
LLNP officer recognized the rights 
of local community to arrange 
the internal use of resources in 
CCA area 
Bobo, Wuasa, 
Betue, Lempe 
3 was not recognized by LLNP officer 
Nested 
enterprises 
The linkages of rules at an 
operational, collective choice, 
and constitutional level  
Bobo, Wuasa, 
Betue, Lempe 
3 some operational rules and 
collective-choice rules of CCA were 
unsupported by constitutional rules 
of national park management  
3.2. The Effectiveness of CCA institutions  
Forest ecosystem conditions in the CCA area represent the institutional performance of CCA. Forest 
ecosystem conditions include forest encroachment, composition of vegetation, and basal area of tree 
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stands. Before implementing the CCA, forest encroachment in Bobo and Wuasa Village was common, 
while the forest encroachment in Betue and Lempe village was low. Since implementing the institution 
of CCA, forest encroachment activities in Bobo, Betue and Lempe villages has decreased. In contrast, 
forest encroachment in Wuasa village continues to occur, and within the Wuasa village, monitoring and 
graduated sanctions are implemented by local institutions.  CCA areas with comparatively better forest 
conditions still implement the principle of monitoring and graduated sanctions. Forest conditions within 
the study villages are included in Table 1. 
 
Table 3. Forest ecosystem condition in CCA area 
Indicator of forest ecosystem 
Forest condition in CCA area 
Bobo village Wuasa village Betue village Lempe village 
Composition of vegetation 
(N/ha) 
        
-  Seedling 12,250 6,250 7,750 17,000 
-  Sapling 1,800 1,480 2,160 1,920 
-  Pole 210 200 280 265 
-  Tree 198 175 163 188 
Basal area of stand (m2/ha) 37.33 25.24 29.55 25.31 
Forest encroachment 
Have not 
occurred 
occur Have not 
occurred 
Have not 
occurred 
Institutional sustainability of 
CCA 
Moderate low high high 
Physical characteristic of 
forest 
        
- Distance from the 
settlement 
0.3 km 0.6 km 1.5 km 0.4 km 
-        Slope (%) >60% 0-8% 40-60% 26-40% 
-        Altitude 750 msl 1,150 msl 1,041 msl 1,227 msl 
Characteristic of community         
-        Ethnic diversity Heterogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous Homogeneous 
-        Indigenous people Kaili Napu Rampi Behoa 
 
Local institutions influence forest conditions (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997), but in this case, the 
number of trees and the basal area of the stands did not have a linear relationship with the institutions.  
The basal area of stands are not directly determined by the institution, but by the physical characteristics 
and socioeconomic conditions (Tucker et al., 2007). However, the robustness of an institution has an 
important role in preventing forest encroachment. CCA institutions that have high sustainability are able 
to prevent forest encroachment. 
The highest average basal area was located in the Bobo village CCA area, and the lowest average basal 
areas were located in Wuasa and Lempe village CCA areas. In this case, the basal area of stands were 
determined by the physical characteristics, particularly by the slope. The local community preference not 
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to use steeply sloped forests in Bobo was based on their desire to protect sources of water and avoid 
landslides. The local communities in Bobo village were highly dependent on the water from LLNP area.  
However, local communities in Wuasa and Lempe village preferred to use the forest that has a relatively 
flat slope to farm and to take the timber for local needs. In Lempe village, local institutions were 
conducting forest monitoring and graduated sanctions so that forest encroachment could be prevented, 
while in Wuasa village, the local institution was not conducting forest monitoring and graduation 
sanctions so that forest encroachment occurred. 
3.3. Policy Space for Self-Governing Institutions of CCA 
From an institutional perspective, policy reform is contingent on the arrangement of property 
rights for LLNP resources that consider a given situation and the capacity of stakeholders. The policy 
space for achieving self-governing institutions through the CCA includes: 1) The arrangement of 
community conservation area that is recognized by all stakeholders; and, 2) The arrangement of 
property rights and authority in the collective decision-making process. 
3.3.1. Rearrangement of the area of CCA 
The clear delineation of area as seen as legitimate by all stakeholders is a principal requirement 
in achieving sustainable forest management (Sinabutar et al., 2014; Kartodihardjo, 2016). 
Recognition of forest areas are possible if the designation process ensures realization of a spatial 
arrangement agreed upon by all stakeholders. Spatial arrangement within LLNP should clarify all 
local community rights in the CCA area. 
There are approximately 31 villages adjacent to LLNP that implemented a CCA facilitated by 
NGOs. The map of CCA areas contained in CCA documentation is not an appropriate basis for 
management because the CCA area outlined in the map has not been agreed upon by the 
communities or the LLNP officers.  Differences in understanding between local communities and 
LLNP officers about the CCA area confirm that the CCA areas have not had accountability and 
legitimacy. Therefore, LLNP officers and local communities should renegotiate and determine clear 
CCA area boundaries. Furthermore, the community conservation management areas need to be 
specified within CCA area maps and integrated into the management planning of LLNP. 
Requirements that should be considered in allocating CCA areas include; 1) The local 
community dependency on resources in that area; 2) The CCA area should not be managed and 
controlled by the local institutions. This means that local institutions must have a high capacity to 
control and manage the uses of natural resources in a CCA area, and that the management activities 
of local communities must be supported by the broader goals of conservation. The arrangement of 
CCA areas should be integrated into the LLNP zoning area, so that it can be enforced through nested 
accountability mechanisms. Integration, in this case, is to explore and adopt traditional spatial 
planning knowledge for local communities within the LLNP zoning map  
3.3.2. Rearrangement of property rights and authority in collective decision-making processes  
The concept of sustainability related to collective action rests on the emphasis on the collective 
decision-making processes (Anderies et al., 2013). Implementation of collective-choice rules in 
regulating the uses of resources in LLNP is a critical point for realizing CCA as a self-governing 
institution. The strong autonomy of rule-making at the local level is a key predictor of better forest 
management that supports local livelihoods (Singh et al. 2011). Based on property rights theory 
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992), the institutional sustainability of CCA could be realized if local 
community rights at a collective choice level were recognized and enforced by the government, and 
ultimately the institution of CCA should be a part of the LLNP management and collaboration 
system.  Rights at a collective-choice level include management rights, exclusion rights and 
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alienation rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 
Based on canonical design principles (Ostrom, 1990), three principles of institutional 
sustainability failed to assist communities in forest management. These principles were collective-
choice arrangements, recognition of the right to organize, and nested enterprises. These principles 
are related to autonomy in the decision-making process. The ineffectiveness of the principles was 
caused partly by structural barriers of legal and formal rules. The legal and formal rules of national 
park management have not yet explicitly granted the collective-choice rights of local communities 
in managing resources in the national park. Institutional sustainability of the CCA requires legal 
protection that recognizes local community rights to manage protected areas, thus incorporating 
the principle of nested authority. 
There are at least three requirements for promoting CCA management as a self-governing 
institution. These requirements are the basis for assessing whether the local community deserves 
to have the rights at the collective level to regulate the uses of forest resources in LLNP area.  These 
requirements include: First, local dependency on forest resources to meet livelihood needs.  The 
proprietor of the resources who depends on resources has a high incentive to maintain those 
resources (Agrawal and Ostrom ,2001). Second, local communities have a common interest in forest 
resources. The common interest of the local communities to preserve water sources in the forest in 
the LLNP area is the driving force of the collective action within communities that preserve forest 
resources. Third, local communities must have strong social capital. Social capital consists of norms, 
relations, and trust (Putnam, 2001; Nurrochmat et al., 2016). Strong social capital of local 
communities promotes cooperation and lower transaction costs (Ray and Bhattacharya, 2011; 
Roslinda, 2013). 
4. Conclusions  
The institution of CCA arrangements have been negotiated since the early 2000s but have not 
yet become part of the institution of National Park management. CCA institutions have barriers to 
endure over the long-term. Specifically, these barriers include insufficient principles related to 
collective-choice arrangements, the lack of recognition of rights to organize, and nested enterprises 
and authority. Therefore, recognizing, strengthening, and integrating CCA institutions within the 
framework of LLNP management should be conducted by LLNP officers to promote sustainable self-
governance within local communities. The institutional sustainability of CCAs should must promote 
unified landscape zoning that clarifies property rights of local communities in the community 
conservation area, and which is thereafter recognized by all stakeholders. 
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